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Minority and Vulnerable Populations
Voting by Mail: A Convenience or a
Disadvantage
Kylan Sophia Josephine Memminger*
Abstract
Mail-in voting has feverishly gained popularity in the United
States over the last few primary and general elections. In light of
this new balloting reality, a trend has emerged. Statistics from
minority and vulnerable populations reveal that mail-in ballots
composed and sent by these groups have been consistently rejected
at a higher rate compared to majority populations. This Note begins
by surveying the constitutional background for bringing a
challenge to voting rights legislation, while confronting the divisive
history of legal precedent surrounding these claims. This Note then
analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board and the balancing test from that decision
applied to election regulation challenges. This Note will then
proceed to identify the legislature’s continued attempt to safeguard
the election process with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and discuss
the origin and evolution of absentee voting in the United States,
pointing out issues faced specifically by minority and vulnerable
groups. After a thorough discussion of these issues, this Note will
advocate for a cognizable claim of action for disenfranchised
minority and vulnerable voters under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, focusing on the application of the
balancing test developed in Crawford to claims of discriminatory
*
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voting practices, manipulating the test to give less deference to how
individual state’s justify strict mail-in voting regulations. This
Note will emphasize the broader utilization of mail-in voting system
moving forward and the importance of correcting systemic errors to
provide unrestricted access to the ballot.
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I. Introduction
Minority and vulnerable populations—those that have
suffered from a historical lack of universal suffrage—are
continuing to be disproportionately affected by voting rights
legislation.1 Specifically, in the wake of the growing popularity of
mail-in voting, rejection rates of ballots from these groups are
consistently higher compared to other populations.2 Imagine that
a middle-aged Black woman named Catherine was planning to
vote by mail in the general election on November 3rd, 2020. She
and her two voting-age sons were also planning to vote by mail,
and all three of them were registered to vote in North Carolina, a
state that requires a witness to verify the ballot was completed
accurately.3 They served as each other’s witnesses and mailed
their ballots in accordance with North Carolina absentee voting
procedures by October 30th, 2020.
A few days later, on November 3rd, Catherine arrived home
from work at 7 p.m. and received an email from the county board
of elections that a deficiency had been assessed in her ballot. It was
Catherine and her sons’ first time voting by mail, and they forgot
1. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128
YALE L.J. 1566, 1594 (2019) (advising that electoral practices that result racial
discrepancies should be banned).
2. See Michael McDonald, North Carolina Early Voting Statistics, U.S.
ELECTIONS PROJECT (Nov. 4, 2020), (reporting that the rejection rate of absentee
ballots from Black, Hispanic, and Native Americans were 1.8%, 2%, and 2.7%
respectively, compared to 0.5% of White ballots rejected) [https://perma.cc/WJ2VV4YD].
3. See Detailed Instructions for Voting by Mail, NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BOARD OF ELECTIONS (2020) (providing instructions for mail-in voters to comply
with in returning their absentee ballots) [https://perma.cc/67BH-FF74].
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to sign the back of each other’s envelopes. As a result, their votes
were not counted. Catherine and her two sons realized they were
unable to correct the error by mail, as it was Election Day, and all
ballots must be postmarked by that day to be counted.4 Catherine
and her sons then rushed to their closest polling location, only to
find a line that was wrapped around the outside of the building.
The polls closed at 7:30 p.m., it was 7:35 p.m., and because they
were not in line before the polls closed, they were unable to cast
their ballots in the 2020 general election.
Now imagine Alan, an eighty-three-year-old man with
macular degeneration, an eye disorder common in people over fifty
that causes impaired vision.5 Alan was planning to vote absentee
in the 2020 general election. He resided and was registered to vote
in Tennessee, a state that required a valid excuse to vote by
absentee ballot.6 Alan was over the age of sixty, therefore he was
able to vote by mail in the election.7 To properly submit his ballot,
he had to complete the ballot in compliance with state mandates,
and sign it to verify completeness and accuracy.8 Upon submission,
Alan’s signature was matched to the signature on his voting
registration application, and if the county administrator of
elections determined it was “not the same,” the ballot would be
rejected.9
That is exactly what happened to Alan, as his ballot was
rejected due to a mismatched signature. His macular degeneration
has affected his ability to read and write printed words the way he
did when he completed his voter registration, and his signature
now looks much different. Although Alan did have the choice to
4. See id. (specifying that for a mail-in ballot to be counted, it must be
postmarked by Election Day).
5. See Dry Macular Degeneration, MAYO CLINIC (Dec. 11, 2020) (explaining
that macular degeneration causes reduced vision in one or both eyes, increased
blurriness
of
printed
words,
and
other
visual
impairments)
[https://perma.cc/UR2A-BTNT].
6. See Absentee By-Mail Ballot Information, TENNESSEE SECRETARY OF
STATE (2020), (clarifying what is considered a valid excuse to vote by absentee
ballot) [https://perma.cc/K9ZU-CWZ3].
7. See id. (elaborating on absentee voting regulations in Tennessee).
8. See id. (emphasizing the importance of a voter’s signature on an absentee
ballot).
9. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 2-202(b) (West 2021) (stating that if a signature
is not the found to be the same, then the ballot will be rejected).
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have assistance in casting his ballot10, Alan’s signature does not
resemble his signature prior to his disorder and did not get
verified. His absentee ballot was rejected, and Alan had no
opportunity to correct his ballot after the fact. This issue was
litigated in the Sixth Circuit, which concluded that the signature
matching requirement did not pose a concrete or imminent threat
of harm, despite the lack of opportunity to correct the deficiency.11
Alan did not feel well enough to make it to the polls on Election
Day, so he was unable to cast a vote in the 2020 general election.
The above scenarios are just two examples; however, they are
exemplary of the disenfranchisement that can occur upon mailing
ballots.12 Treatment of absentee ballots is a very important issue,
and this Note will focus on how historically discriminated minority
and vulnerable groups deserve constitutional protection on the
right to cast a mail-in ballot.13
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II14 will elaborate on the
divisive history of voting rights legislation and precedent in our
country.15 It will begin with an explanation of the constitutional
background and then proceed to identify and analyze the Supreme
Court case Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,16 that has
been fundamental in assessing the constitutionality of voting
regulations.17 The Crawford decision is the cornerstone for an
analysis of whether there are conceivable protections afforded to
minority and vulnerable groups attempting to cast an absentee
10. See 52 U.S.C. § 10508 (2018) (specifying that “any voter who requires
assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write
may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s
employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.”).
11. See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 978 F.3d 378, 390
(2020) (finding that no irreparable harm was demonstrated).
12. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 1582 (recognizing the treatment of
absentee ballot issues in the judicial system to be integral to providing a fair
election administration).
13. See discussion infra Part V.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd. 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008)
(holding that an Indiana election law requiring photo identification did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
17. See id. at 189 (establishing a framework for evaluating the burden a
state law imposes on a voter).
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ballot.18 There, the Supreme Court proffers a balancing test that
has the potential be manipulated and applied to evaluate absentee
voting regulations that disproportionately affect minority and
vulnerable groups.19
Part III20 will explore how the legislature has attempted to
regulate anti-discriminatory practices and promote fairness in
election procedures through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
subsequent corresponding legislation.
Part IV21 will discuss the origins of absentee voting and
expound on the growing popularity of submitting a vote by mail.
The section proceeds by pointing out issues minority and
vulnerable groups face in casting a mail-in ballot and identifies
common absentee voting regulations and state justifications for
implementation.
Part V22 will advocate for a cognizable claim of action for
disenfranchised minority and vulnerable voters under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There has been
a small amount of scholarship about this issue.23 However, this
argument will focus on the application of the balancing test
developed in Crawford to claims of discriminatory voting practices,
while providing a recommendation for courts to give less deference
to the state justifications for mail-in ballot regulations that are
shown to disproportionately affect minority and vulnerable
groups.24 The argument will conclude by emphasizing the broader
utilization of the mail-in voting system moving forward and

18. See id. at 191–204 (employing the balance test on claims of
disenfranchisement by the absentee ballot regime).
19. See id. at 189 (weighing state justifications against the burdens imposed
on voters); see also discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.
22. See discussion infra Part V.
23. See Sal H. Lee, Judicial Review of Absentee Voting Laws: How Courts
Should Balance State Interests Against the Fundamental Right to Vote Going
Forward, 105 IOWA L. REV. 799, 821–23 (2020) (arguing that the Crawford
balancing test should be applied to absentee voting claims, yet proposing that the
burden should be shifted to the state to provide sufficient justifications for any
voting requirement that imposes a burden on a voter).
24. See discussion infra Part V.
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II. Background
Racially motivated challenges to election law have surfaced in
American jurisprudence over the last century.26 As these
challenges are brought forward, judicial interpretations of cases
pertaining to voting rights issues have simultaneously evolved.27
This section summarizes the evolution of election law in the form
of claims brought in the interest of disenfranchised minority
voters. It sets the stage for an analysis of modern society’s shift to
an overall increase in absentee voting among all voter populations,
and the subsequent impact on minority and vulnerable voters.28 As
society hosts more elections that permit voters choose to mail-in
votes, there is a persistent disparity of rejected ballots between
majority and minority voter populations.29 This section will
identify the legal background for challenging this disparity and
facilitate the discussion of whether these disparaged groups have
the potential to be afforded protections under the constitution or
the Voting Rights Act.30

25. See discussion infra Part V.
26. See Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the
Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 1–3 (2006) (analyzing the “racial
gap” in lost votes between Black and White voters in recent elections through
litigation that had been brought forward based on allegations of voter
disenfranchisement).
27. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 467–68 (1953) (extending the reach of
Fifteenth Amendment protections against racial discrimination to state action).
28. See EAVS DEEP DIVE: EARLY, ABSENTEE AND MAIL VOTING, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N, Oct. 17, 2017, at 2 (distinguishing voting trends in the 21st
century from earlier voting procedures and elaborating on the current trends that
include
increased
rates
of
early,
absentee,
and
mail
voting)
[https://perma.cc/NS3W-FPNL].
29. See Curt Devine & Drew Griffin, Georgia County Tosses Out Hundreds
of Minority Absentee Ballots, CNN (Oct. 21, 2018, 9:05 AM) (publicizing that more
than 300 of 595 rejected absentee ballots from an election in a Georgia county
belonged to Asian Americans and African Americans, emphasizing the disparate
treatment of minority voters) [https://perma.cc/BK8R-M5HD].
30. See discussion infra Part II.
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A. Constitutional Protections Against Voter Discrimination

The individual states have the power to control the “times,
places and manner of holding Elections” pursuant to Article I of
the United States Constitution.31 Various constitutional
amendments and federal laws have been enacted to elaborate on
the protections of United States citizens’ voting rights.32 The
amendments have focused on expanding protections against
discrimination based on age, gender, race, and pecuniary
interests.33 This section will elaborate on the constitutional
amendments that have been enacted to prohibit discrimination
against minority populations and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions ruling on challenges to these provisions.34
1. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment35 was adopted into the United
States Constitution in the immediate aftermath of the American
Civil War to prevent states from making or enforcing laws that
would abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.36 This amendment grants the states leeway in prescribing
election restrictions that impose reasonable burdens on ballot

31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
32. See Voting and Election Laws, USA GOV, https://www.usa.gov/votinglaws (last updated June 18, 2021) (summarizing the advancements in United
States voting laws) [https://perma.cc/9YKU-GWWB].
33. See id. (enumerating the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments and their effects on voting rights in the United
States).
34. See discussion infra Part II.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to
Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, WM. & MARY FACULTY
PUBL’N 779, 42–43 (1965) (explaining that the “Reconstruction Committee” of the
thirty-ninth congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment to further objectives of
prohibiting states from disenfranchising their citizens).
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access.37 The obligation of determining the extent of “reasonable”
burdens has traditionally been in the hands of the state judiciary.38
Despite this margin of unique privilege, the states are
prohibited from placing burdens on their citizens’ right to vote that
are not reasonably justified by the states important regulatory
interest.39 The asserted injury to the right to vote is weighed
against the specific interests alleged by the state as justifications
for the implementation of the election procedure or rule and a
determination is made about whether the restriction is
reasonable.40
The Fourteenth Amendment includes an Equal Protection
Clause.41 The Equal Protection Clause has often been asserted as
a basis for voting discrimination claims and analyzed by the
Supreme Court to evaluate challenges to voting laws that
disproportionately effect minority and vulnerable groups.42 The
Supreme Court has held that when challenges to voting rights are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, the judiciary must
review the challenge to ensure it is closely scrutinized and
carefully confined.43 This is because a the right to vote is

37. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (upholding Hawaii’s
prohibition on write-in voting as a reasonable burden on voters that was
constitutionally valid).
38. See id. at 428 (filing a claim in the district court for the District of Hawaii
to determine whether Hawaii’s election laws reasonably permitted mail-in
voting).
39. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983) (explaining that
comprehensive state election codes are for the purpose of upholding the integrity
of the election proves and that the state’s important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions).
40. See id. at 789 (employing a balancing test to evaluate if a ballot
restriction is considered a reasonable burden).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws.”).
42. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88–89 (1932) (holding that a state law
denying Blacks the right to vote violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause).
43. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
(examining a challenge to a Virginia poll tax and declaring it unconstitutional in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
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considered a fundamental right and liberty that deserves
protection from the unsubstantiated governmental interference.44
a. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
In 2008, the Supreme Court heard a challenge under the
Fourteenth Amendment to an Indiana State law45 that required a
government issued photo identification as a requirement to vote.46
The question presented was whether, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the State’s justifications were sufficient to rationalize
a voting restriction imposed on voters.47 The Court held in favor of
the State, finding that the State interests were neutral and
sufficiently strong, and that State election law did not create any
“excessively burdensome requirements” on any class of voters and
therefore, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.48
The State election law at issue in Crawford49 required citizens
voting in person either early or on election day to present
government-issued photo identification in both primary and
general elections.50 No photo identification was required to be
eligible to register to vote, and if a voter was able to verify their
residence and identity, the State provided free photo
identification.51 The photo identification requirement did not apply

44. See id. (applying the judicial scrutiny of a fundamental right and liberty
to the right to vote and emphasizing that it is especially necessary when the
challenge involves wealth or race).
45. IND. CODE. ANN. § 3–11–8–25.1(e) (West 2019).
46. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd. 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008)
(framing the question before the Court).
47. See id. at 191 (focusing on the relevant and legitimate state interests to
decide whether the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. See id. at 202–04 (weighing the interests of the State against the burden
on the voters to determine the constitutionality of the statute).
49. See id. at 185 (challenging a State election law in the Supreme Court
that imposes a requirement on citizens to present photo identification issued by
the government prior to voting).
50. See id. at 186 (requiring citizens to obtain and show valid photo
identification issued by the government to vote in person).
51. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 186. (defining the procedure a voter undergoes
to obtain photo identification to be in compliance with the statute).
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to absentee ballots submitted by mail.52 The statute also contained
exceptions for citizens who lived and voted in a state-licensed
facility.53
Under the statute, if a voter was indigent or had a religious
objection to being photographed, an affidavit had to be executed
within ten days at the circuit court clerk’s officer for the ballot to
be counted.54 If a voter was unable to present photo identification
at the polls, there was an opportunity to file a provisional ballot
and proof of photo identification had to be produced within ten
days at the circuit court clerk’s office for the ballot to be counted.55
Plaintiffs, the Indiana Democratic Party and the Marion
County Democratic Central Committee (“the State”), filed suit in
the district court, seeking judgment to declare the statute invalid
and to enjoin its enforcement.56 Plaintiffs alleged that the photo
identification requirement “substantially burdened the right to
vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”57 Further,
Plaintiffs attacked the State’s justification for the requirement,
and argued that it is an “unjustified burden” on voters who are not
able to readily obtain government-issued identification.58 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State59,
and the court of appeals in the Seventh Circuit affirmed.60
52. See id. (distinguishing between when the photo identification
requirement applies, and when it does not apply).
53. See id. (providing a nursing home as an example of a state-licensed
facility where a resident would be exempt from the requirement).
54. See id. (demonstrating the voting process for a person who has inability
to obtain government photo identifications or has moral objections to being
photographed).
55. See id. (explaining the course of action for a voter who does not present
identification when casting a ballot to ensure the ballot is cast in conformity with
the statute).
56. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 186–87 (summarizing the basis for Plaintiffs’
claim).
57. See id. at 187 (encapsulating the allegations that Plaintiffs’ purported in
the district court).
58. See id. (arguing that the photo identification requirement is neither
necessary nor appropriate as a method of avoiding election fraud, a justification
offered by the State for imposing the statute).
59. See id. at 187–88 (finding that there was no evidence of any voters who
would have their right to vote unduly burdened by the state requirement).
60. See id. at 188 (concluding that the burden on voters was offset by the
state’s legitimate objective of reducing the risk of election fraud).

300

28 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 287 (2021)
b. The Crawford Opinion

In a plurality opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens,
the Court delivered judgment in favor of the State.61 The Court
found the statute requiring government-issued photo
identification to vote was supported by legitimate state interests
that offset any burdens placed on voters.62
Justice Stevens began by evaluating the state interests put
forth in justifying the statute.63 Election modernization, the
prevention of voter fraud, and the safeguarding of voter confidence
were all analyzed against the burden of obtaining and producing a
valid government-issued photo identification.64 The State’s
interest in election modernization was supported by then-recent
federal legislation indicating Congress’s belief that photo
identification is a reliable method of establishing voter
qualifications.65
The interest of preventing voter fraud by requiring photo
identification was narrowly construed by the Court as an interest
in averting in-person voter impersonation.66 The Court
acknowledged that there was no record of any fraud occurring in
the State at any time in its history.67 However, the Court reasoned
that because this type of fraud had occurred in other parts of the
country, and preventing it served to maintain an “orderly
administration” and “accurate recordkeeping,” a sufficient

61. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd. 553 U.S. 181, 184–204 (2008)
(weighing the two competing claims and delivering judgment in favor of the
State).
62. See id. at 204 (concluding that the burden on voters did not outweigh the
state interests put forward to support the statute).
63. See id. at 191 (analyzing the interests that the State has identified to
justify the potential burdens that the statute imposes on voters).
64. See id. at 192–200 (listing the State interests applied as justifications for
the photo identification requirement).
65. See id. at 192–94 (verifying the State’s interests in issuing a photo
identification by comparing federal legislation that encompasses similar
requirements as a means to improve the integrity of the election process).
66. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194 (narrowing the inquiry to voter fraud that
could reasonably occur if the state statute was not upheld).
67. See id. at 194–95 (pointing out that there is no evidence that the State
has experienced voter fraud of this kind in its history).
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justification existed to uphold the statute.68 The Court rationalized
that the interest of safeguarding voter confidence to determine
that it was not only closely related to the State’s interest, but also
possessed an independent significance of promoting the democratic
process.69
The Court addressed the burdens inherent in the preservation
of the photo identification requirement.70 Ultimately, Justice
Stevens concluded that the burdens were “neither so serious nor so
frequent” to deem that the state statute was unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment.71 Further, the Court
acknowledged burdens imposed on eligible voters that do not have
photo identification that were compliant with the statute.72 The
Court pointed to the alternative method of compliance
unambiguously provided in the statute—casting a provisional
ballot—as adequate means of rectifying any potential burdens.73
2. The Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment74 to the United States Constitution
was enacted into law as a consequence of the pervasive racial

68. See id. at 195–96 (reasoning that the interest of preventing voter fraud
in this manner is supported by examples throughout other parts of the country
and would simultaneously benefit the State’s administrative goals).
69. See id. at 197 (finding that public confidence in the electoral process will
encourage participation in the democratic process).
70. See id. at 197 (providing examples of burdens that a voter may “lose his
photo identification,” “have his wallet stolen on the way to the polls,” or “not
resemble the photo identification” because of cosmetic changes).
71. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (characterizing the burdens as “life’s
vagaries” and determining that they do not pose constitutional issues).
72. See id. at 198–99 (clarifying that the burdens imposed on people who do
not possess the required identification are the most relevant burdens to the issue).
73. See id. at 198–99 (rationalizing that the severity of the burdens are
mitigated by the ability to cast a provisional ballot, and provide proper
identification, or execute a required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s office
within ten days).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“[T]he right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”); U.S. CONST. amend.
XV, § 2. (“[T]he congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation”).
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disparity following the American Civil War.75 To comprehensively
analyze the racial disparity in mail-in voting, it is vital to discuss
the Fifteenth Amendment’s broad voting protections on account of
“race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”76 To effectuate this
provision, Congress is granted the power to enforce by enacting
appropriate legislation.77
Despite the passage of this amendment, some states fashioned
ancillary barriers to voting that disproportionately affected
minority populations, such as literacy tests.78 Immediately after
the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress ratified the
Enforcement Act of 187079 to apply the contours of the Fifteenth
Amendment directly against the denial of the right to vote on
account of race or color and attempt to eliminate any
accompanying discrimination.80 An amendment to the
Enforcement Act furthered these objectives by establishing a
system of federal supervision of state elections.81 Despite these
legislative commitments, Congress repealed a majority of the
provisions of the enforcement act by 1894.82
The United States was still experiencing persistent and
unrelenting racism in the federal and state electoral process
during the nineteenth century through a variety of state-enacted
election restrictions intended to disenfranchise Black voter
75. See John Marby Mathews, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 11–13 (1909) (synthesizing the general purpose of the
enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment to a method of requiring the individual
States to ensure Black suffrage in their respective election processes).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
78. See Voting and Election Laws, USA GOV (last updated Sept. 1, 2020)
(explaining that states continued to restrict access to voting after the enactment
of the Fifteenth Amendment) [https://perma.cc/BGJ9-9U2B].
79. Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
80. See Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 22, 16 Stat. 145–46 (establishing that
it is a federal crime to violate state laws governing election processes); Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 4–6, 19, 16 Stat. 141, 144 (stating that a private or official
interference with a citizen’s right to vote is a criminal offense); Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, §§ 20, 22, 16 Stat. 145 (mandating that a fraudulent act relating to
the registration of voters or count of ballots is a violation of federal law).
81. See Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (requiring the federal
supervision of state elections).
82. See Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (repealing the provision that
concerned federal supervision of state elections).
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populations.83 The Fifteenth Amendment served as a basis for
affording constitutional protections and enacting federal voting
rights laws in the interest of voters who are discriminated against
based on race, color, or otherwise.84
III. Federal Protections Against Discriminatory Election Practices
In an effort to compound the protections afforded to voters
inherent in the constitution, Congress has enacted federal
legislation to combat rampant discrimination in election law.85 The
expansive legislation has provided a framework for an abundance
of claims filed on behalf of disenfranchised voters.86 This section
will explore the history, extent, and availability of those claims,
and will end with a case discussion of a state absentee ballot
provision that disproportionately affected minority voters.87
A. History of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 196588 was passed by the EightyNinth Congress as a federal law with the intention to supplement
the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and to explicitly prohibit racial
discrimination in voting.89 The Voting Rights Act prohibits
nationwide voter discrimination based on race, color, or

83. See Robert J. Deichert, The Fifteenth Amendment at a Crossroads, 32 U.
CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1080–1081 (2000) (elaborating on the state’s defiance of the
Fifteenth Amendment through subterfuge in the form of restrictions that proved
to disproportionately affected Black voters).
84. See id. (reiterating the confines of the Fifteenth Amendment
protections).
85. See Moke & Saphire, supra note 26, at 15 (asking how the copious
amount of American voting laws applies to the racial gap in voting).
86. See id. (pointing out that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Voting
Rights Act broadly in an effort to curb voter discrimination).
87. See discussion infra Part I.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2018).
89. See Brian K. Landsberg, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF
THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 11–12 (UNIV. PRESS OF KAN. 2007) (examining the
origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and proclaiming that it arose from a
systematic violation of the Fifteenth Amendment by state and local officials).
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membership in a language minority group.90 A discussion of the
Voting Rights Act is relevant in assessing the protections afforded
to minority and vulnerable voters when returning an absentee
ballot.91
Two main purposes for enacting the Voting Right Act emerge
from the copious legislative history of the Act.92 First, Congress felt
“confronted” by the duplicitous evil of voter discrimination that
was preserved in the United States despite the equal protection
commands of the constitution.93 Second, Congress was interested
in replacing the previous remedies that proved to be unsuccessful
with more elaborate measures that would generate compliance
with the Fifteenth Amendment.94
Passage of the Act was also largely in response to indirect
efforts by the states to disenfranchise minority voters in the
electoral process.95 The Voting Rights Act is not a permanent piece
of legislation, yet Congress regularly extends the sections of the
act for numerous years at a time.96 The last extension of the law
was in 2006, for a period of twenty-five years.97

90. See Voting and Election Laws, USA GOV, (last updated Sept. 1, 2020)
(paraphrasing the widespread protections of the Voting Rights Act)
[https://perma.cc/BGJ9-9U2B].
91. See Landsberg, supra note 89, at 13 (providing that the Voting Rights
Act allows for robust protections of minority and vulnerable voting groups).
92. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966)
(summarizing the relevant considerations from the abundance of committee
hearings and floor debates that surrounded the passage of the Voting Rights Act).
93. See id. (opining that Congress considered voter discrimination an
insidious evil that required legislative action).
94. See id. (interpreting the need for new legislation in the realm of voter
discrimination as an indication that remedies prescribed in the past were
unsuccessful at curing racial bias in the electoral framework).
95. See Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting Voting Rights in
the Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928, 1936–37 (2013) (analyzing
the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a response to states impending
poll taxes, literacy tests, and a multitude of other barriers to restrict minority
populations).
96. See History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (last
updated July 28, 2017) (describing that Congress has the power to extend sections
of the Voting Rights Act for specific periods of time) [https://perma.cc/5PUYRCZG].
97. See id. (pointing out that Congress most recently renewed the provisions
of the Voting Rights Act in 2006).
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To best understand the judicial protection against voting
discrimination, this Section will proceed with a discussion of
prominent sections of the Voting Rights Act and noteworthy
decisions that incorporated those sections.98
1. The Coverage Formula in Section 4 and its Effect on States
through Section 5
Prior to 2013, the Voting Rights Act prohibited states from
enacting election practices that either have a discriminatory
purpose or effect through the operation of two sections working in
tandem.99 Section 4(b) contained a coverage formula that was used
to determine whether a specific state was carrying out election
procedures that were discriminating against racial populations.100
The first element analyzed was whether the state was utilizing any
tests that voter applicants had to pass to be given the opportunity
to vote.101 Examples of these tests include literacy tests, or
assessments that a person had good moral character.102 The second
element of the formula was a determination by the Director of the
Census of whether less than fifty percent of voting aged citizens
were registered to vote, or that less than fifty percent of voting
aged citizens voted in the 1964 presidential election.103 The
coverage formula was renewed and extended regularly until 2006,

98. See discussion infra Part I.
99. See Statutes Enforced by the Voting Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (last
updated Sept. 11, 2020) (explaining that Section 4 sets out a formula used to
determine which states are subject to the restrictions laid out within Section 5)
[https://perma.cc/6Q6N-3VWD].
100. See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (last updated
May 5, 2020) (commentating on the purpose of enacting Section 4(b) in the scope
of voting rights legislation) [https://perma.cc/3H82-VRR7].
101. See id. (paraphrasing the first subset of criteria that state election
procedures had to meet to comply with Section 4(b)).
102. See id. (laying out examples of tests that states were not permitted to use
in their election practices because of the discriminatory effect on populations).
103. See id. (expanding on the second element of the coverage formula
established in Section 4(b)).
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and was also modified to address voting discrimination against
language minority groups.104
Another section of the Act functioned to enforce these
ambitious requirements.105 Section 5 applied to states that fell
within the coverage framework set forth in Section 4(b).106 These
states’ and their political subdivisions were considered “covered”
and were not permitted to amend their election practices or
procedures unless they were proven to not have a discriminatory
purpose or effect.107 To determine the effect of the proposed election
law, covered states were required to have either an administrative
review by the Attorney General or a lawsuit in the United States
district court for the District of Columbia before enacting a new
voting procedure.108 The provisions within Section 5 persisted by
legislative extension until the coverage formula in Section 4(b) was
ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2013, leaving
Section 5 virtually irrelevant to the election regulatory scheme.109
2. Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder
In 2013, the Supreme Court held that Section 4(b), a
historically controversial provision of the Voting Rights Act, as
unconstitutional.110 Shelby County is located in Alabama, a state
that previously met the coverage formula under Section 4(b) and
104. See id. (detailing the reoccurrence expansion of the coverage formula
throughout the history of voting legislation).
105. See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (last updated Sept.
11, 2020) (explaining that section 5 targets states with election practices that
have a discriminatory purpose or effect) [https://perma.cc/8C26-D7QS].
106. See id. (naming jurisdictions as “covered” if they met the criteria in
Section 4(b)).
107. See id. (elaborating on the process for covered states to enact new voting
legislation).
108. See id. (defining the two processes that a covered state can go through to
prove that a proposed voting restriction does not abridge the right to vote for any
populations).
109. See id. (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that Section 5 was effectively
overruled when the Supreme Court ruled Section 4(b) as unconstitutional).
110. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (holding that
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, permitting a coverage formula used to
prevent states from flagrant voter discrimination, was unconstitutional).
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required federal preclearance before enacting a voting
restriction.111 Shelby County sued the U.S. Attorney General in the
District of Columbia, claiming that Section 4(b) and Section 5 were
facially unconstitutional.112 The district court ruled against the
County, finding that the statutory framework was constitutionally
sound, and the court of appeals affirmed.113 In a 5–4 opinion
authored by Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court reversed the
district court and the court of appeals, holding that section 4(b)
was unconstitutional.114 The Court did not issue a holding on
Section 5, leaving room for Congress to potentially draft another
coverage formula based on warranting conditions.115 This holding
was primarily based on principles of state autonomy and equal
sovereignty among the states.116
The Court found that Section 4(b) did not satisfy these
foundational tenets of the Constitution, as the preclearance
requirement permitted federal intrusion on state policymaking.117
Further, the Court acknowledged that the coverage formula in
Section 4(b) was based on expired data and could no longer pass
constitutional muster as the disparate voter turnout no longer
existed.118
Throughout the dicta of the opinion, the Court noted that the
abysmal discriminatory voting processes that originally justified
the provisions contained within Sections 4 and 5 no longer existed

111. See id. at 540–41 (establishing Shelby County’s standing).
112. See id. at 541–42 (examining the background of the constitutional
challenge heard by the Supreme Court).
113. See id. (reviewing the procedural history to explain that the court
drastically departed from the preceding decisions).
114. See id. at 557 (determining that the coverage formula under Section 2
did not comply with the requirements of the constitution).
115. See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 557 (acknowledging that in the future the
climate of election restrictions may require a coverage formula to address voter
discrimination).
116. See id. at 543–44 (analyzing the constitutional guarantee of state
sovereignty in conjunction with the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty”).
117. See id. at 544–45 (reckoning that allowing federal approval of a state law
conflicts with the state sovereignty inherent in our constitution and could result
in an interference with state legislative decisions).
118. See id. at 547–51 (pointing out that our modern society does not face the
same discriminatory issues as the culture at the time the original coverage
formula was developed as the voter turnout gap has dramatically narrowed).
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in those jurisdictions, and therefore no preclearance was
required.119 Simultaneously, the Court gave apparent recognition
that voting discrimination still existed in the United States.120
Despite the radical decision, the Court emphasized that judicial
remedy for voting discrimination still, and would permanently,
exist under Section 2.121 Justice Roberts hesitated to overrule an
act of Congress, yet the record compelled “no choice but to declare
§ 4(b) unconstitutional.”122 Ultimately, the Court agreed with
Shelby County and found that the preclearance requirement
exceeded the authority of the Constitution.123
3. Justice Ginsberg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsberg, with the support of three more Justices,
authored a dissent that took a position of continued enforcement
of the provisions in dispute.124 Justice Ginsberg argued that
Congress had the ability to enact and renew the Voting Rights Act,
and more specifically, Sections 4(b) and 5, through the power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.125 Support for
this notion was cited through legislative history and previous

119. See id. at 535 (finding that voting conditions have considerably departed
from the excessive discrimination that supported the passage of Section 4(b)).
120. See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 536 (retreating from the original
perspective laid out by the court that voting discrimination was not a substantial
issue).
121. See id. at 537, 557 (highlighting that Section 2 does not apply in the
present case yet exists as a ban on racial discrimination).
122. See id. at 556–557 (“[S]triking down an act of Congress is the gravest and
most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.”) (quoting Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)).
123. See id. at 557 (finding that our current needs do not require the burdens
imposed on the states by permitting the coverage formula).
124. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 559–94 (2013) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress operated by legitimate authority when
enacting and renewing Sections 4(b) and 5).
125. See id. at 566 (contending that congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments commands “substantial deference”).
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precedent that permitted congressional authority to prevent state
abuse and disregard of these amendments.126
The dissent was premised on the notion that Congress did not
have unlimited authority, and that the means taken within their
enforcement powers must have rationally advanced a legitimate
objective.127 Justice Ginsberg found that here, the congressional
reauthorization of the preclearance requirements satisfied the
rational-basis test for three reasons.128
First, the extensive legislative record that supported the
initial legislation warranted significant deference.129 Second, the
inherent limitation Congress built into the act when it required
reauthorization exemplified the intention to review the current
needs of the federal voting scheme and modify accordingly.130
Third, the recognized improvement in voting discrimination
should have served as a signal that the preclearance requirements
were operating as intended, and indicated no reason to invalidate
the applicable provisions.131 Additionally, Justice Ginsberg
recognized the limitations of requiring plaintiffs to only rely on
Section 2 litigation when submitting a voting discrimination
case.132
Ultimately, Justice Ginsberg concluded that Section 4(b)
should not be invalidated, and that the preclearance requirements,
126. See id. at 567–68 (explaining that the Fifteenth Amendment provides
Congress with enforcement powers to enact appropriate legislation to combat
state discriminatory practices).
127. See id. at 569–70 (purporting that the proper standard for judicial review
is the rational-basis test, and that the court should review the congressional
record accordingly).
128. See id. at 569 (listing justifications for congressional reauthorization of
the provisions that create and enforce the federal preclearance requirements).
129. See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S at 569 (recognizing that Congress is entitled
to consider the legislative record when the legislation was initially enacted and
when it was renewed to determine if the rational-basis test is met).
130. See id. (giving Congress deference in their decision to renew the
preclearance provisions).
131. See id. (providing an explanation for the decreased disparity in voter
turnout and attributing the improvements to the implementation and
enforcement of the preclearance requirements).
132. See id. at 572 (finding that a voting discrimination claim under Section
2 is an “inadequate substitute” for preclearance requirements as it attacks
discriminatory practices retroactively, as opposed to the preclearance
requirements, which defy discrimination proactively).
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as they were enacted, have made strides toward fulfilling the
commands of the Fifteenth Amendment to reduce voting
discrimination.133
B. The Realities of Vote Denial and Vote Dilution Under Section 2
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was enacted to prohibit both
first-generation and second-generation barriers to voting by
banning any state “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color.”134 It was originally
successful in eliminating only first-generation barriers to voting,
which are regulations fashioned to exclude populations from voting
based solely on a discriminatory purpose.135 Excluding an entire
race from voting in a state election, based solely on race, is an
example of a first-generation barrier to voting.136
Despite the progress made towards phasing out voter
inequality in the wake of the Voting Rights Act, state and local
elections were not entirely impervious to discriminatory
practices.137 Second-generation barriers imposed by state election
laws limit the influence that minority voters have on the election
process through incidental constraints on the election process
targeted directly at minority and vulnerable populations.138
133. See id. at 593 (identifying the positive impact the preclearance
requirements had on reducing voter discrimination in our country).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2018).
135. See Jenigh J. Garrett, The Continued Need for the Voting Rights Act:
Examining Second-generation Discrimination, 30 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 77,
81 (2010) (defining a first-generation barrier to voting, and the regulatory impact
the Voting Rights Act had on eradicating them from the electoral system in the
United States).
136. See id. (providing that first-generation barriers serve to exclude entire
classes of people from the right to vote).
137. See Jamelia N. Morgan, Disparate Impact and Voting Rights: How
Objections to Impact-Based Claims Prevent Plaintiffs from Prevailing in Cases
Challenging New Forms of Disenfranchisement, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 93, 95
(2018) (purporting that second-generation barriers evolved to indirectly insulate
political institutions from integration as a response to the elimination of firstgeneration barriers).
138. See id. at 95–96 (analyzing the effects of second-generation barriers as
an impairment on the strength of the minority vote).
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Implementing these barriers involves manipulation of an electoral
structure to disproportionately exclude minority populations from
the electoral process.139 Examples of second-generation barriers to
voting are redistricting a county to diminish the impact of the
minority vote, or disenfranchising a felon from the opportunity to
vote.140
Under Section 2, voters are permitted to seek judicial review
if they believe that a state or local government has limited voting
rights on the basis of race, color, or membership in a language
minority group.141 Claims brought under this title are typically
characterized as “vote denial” or “vote dilution.”142 Vote denial
happens when a person is directly denied the opportunity to cast a
ballot or have their vote accurately counted.143 Vote dilution occurs
when the strength of a person’s vote is diminished by state
electoral practices.144 Section 2 arguably has the largest impact on
federal voting requirements as it effectively acts as an enforcement
mechanism to guarantee the commands of the Fifteenth
Amendment.145
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to include language that
reads “results in a denial or abridgement,”146 replacing the original

139. See id. at 96 (evaluating the negative implications of second-generation
barriers on the influence minority populations have on an election’s outcome).
140. See id. at 96–97 (proffering a second-generation barrier utilized to
exclude the minority vote); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where
Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006)
(providing “felon disenfranchisement” as an example of a second-generation
barrier used to denial a class of persons the right to vote).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2018).
142. See Morgan, supra note 137, at 97 (distinguishing between vote denial
and vote dilution by the ultimate impact on voter populations).
143. See id. (expounding on the direct impact of vote denial).
144. See id. (paraphrasing the consequences of vote dilution on minority
populations).
145. See id. (elaborating on the legislative foundation of vote denial and vote
dilution).
146. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 443 (describing the impact the congressional amendment
on the original Section 2 had on shifting the burden of proof from the state’s
“purpose” to discriminate by the electoral law in question to the “effect” the state’s
electoral law in question had on discrimination).
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dialect mimicking the Fifteenth Amendment.147 Scholars have
determine that by making this amendment, Congress intended for
Section 2 to provide protection against voting laws that either
intentionally, or unintentionally, racially discriminated.148 The
Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles149 defined the appropriate
question to ask in a vote dilution case as “whether as a result of
the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs’ do not have an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and elect
candidates of their choice.”150
The protections afforded by Section 2 are permanently
enforceable and apply across all jurisdictions in the United
States.151 Section 2 is violated if, “based on the totality of the
circumstances,” protected citizens “have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process.”152 The Supreme Court has identified several factors that
courts may consider in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances.153
1. Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs
In 2020, the Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to two Arizona
state election laws on the premise that they were in violation of the
Voting Rights Act, the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
147. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89–110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437
(1965) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, or practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.”).
148. See Tokaji, supra note 146, at 443–44 (purporting that Congress’s
amendment to Section 2 intended to overrule a Supreme Court decision that
extended the reach of Section 2 only to protections against intentional
discrimination).
149. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (stating the questions
to ask to establish Section 2 violations).
150. See id. (quoting the Senate Report to the 1982 Amendments).
151. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537 (distinguishing Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act from Section 5, stating that Section 2 is permanent and
widespread).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2018).
153. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37 (listing the factors that should be
examined to determine if Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is violated).
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Amendments to the United States Constitution.154 The first law
challenged was Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy155 of completely
discarding, rather than partially counting, ballots cast by voters in
the wrong precinct.156 The second law challenged a statute (“H.B.
2023”)157 that criminalized the third party collection and delivery
of another person’s absentee ballot.158
Plaintiff, the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”), sued
Arizona’s Secretary of State and Attorney General in federal
district court.159 The DNC argued that the out-of-precinct policy
and H.B. 2023 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because
they disparately affected minority groups voting privileges.160 The
DNC further claimed that H.B. 2023 violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was
enacted with discriminatory intent.161 Lastly, the DNC contended
that both laws violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
because they unduly burdened the minority vote.162 The district
court found in favor of the State on all of the claims.163 The DNC

154. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (2020)
(rehearing a case en banc that challenged Arizona election laws).
155. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16–122 (Lexis 1994) (providing that for a vote to
be counted, voter must vote in their specifically assigned precinct).
156. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 999 (asserting that the procedure of wholly
discarding votes cast in a precinct other than that in which a voter is registered
is a violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act).
157. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16–1005(H), (I) (Lexis 2016) (criminalizing the
collection and return of another voter’s absentee ballot).
158. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2020)
(denouncing the policy that effectuated the statute that prohibited third party
collection and return of ballots).
159. See id. (summarizing the initial action that led to the litigation).
160. See id. (arguing that Section 2 protections against discriminatory voting
practices prevents the application of the Arizona voting laws).
161. See id. (claiming that H.B. 2023 was ratified with racial prejudice in
violation of Section 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment).
162. See id. (contending that the First and Fourteenth Amendment provide
protections for minority groups that are disproportionately affected by the
enactment of the voting regulations at issue).
163. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 998 (ruling in favor of Arizona in the district
court).
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appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit and the judgement was
affirmed.164
Following that decision, a majority of non-recused, active
judges voted to rehear the case en banc.165 Judge William A.
Fletcher opened his opinion for the Ninth Circuit by declaring that
the right to vote is the foundation of our democracy.166 The court
evaluated both Arizona state election laws under the “results test”
found within section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.167 The first step of
the test was to ask whether, the law at issue resulted in a disparate
burden on a protected class.168 The second step of the test was more
complex.169 It asked whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the disparate burden on minority voters was linked
to social and historical conditions in Arizona so as “to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by minority and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives.”170
The court began its analysis of out-of-precinct policy under the
first prong of the results test by identifying uncontradicted
evidence, presented in the district court that established minority
voters comprised discarded out-of-precinct votes at a rate of two to
one.171 Throughout the inquiry, multiple errors in the district
court’s analysis were debunked.172 For example, the district court
concluded that because the amount of out-of-precinct votes was

164. See id. (affirming the decision by a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit).
165. See id. (ordering the case to be reheard en banc).
166. See id. at 998–99 (emphasizing the basic right to vote is essential to
maintain a democratic society) (quoting Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl
Warren 306 (1977)).
167. See id. at 1011–33 (analyzing the effects of the election laws under the
framework developed in the Supreme Court for Section 2 claims).
168. See id. at 1012 (asking if voters have an equal opportunity to participate
in the political process despite the existence of the voting regulation at issue).
169. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1011 (describing that step two involves an
investigation into the election law at issue and the specific historical and social
context in the state in which it was enacted).
170. See id. (enumerating the second prong of the results test) (quoting
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (alteration in original)).
171. See id. at 1014 (pointing out that minority voter groups were primarily
disadvantaged by the out-of-precinct policy).
172. See id. at 1014–16 (finding that the district court had correct data but
failed to apply it in a manner that recognized the apparent injustice).
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declining on average, there could not be a disparate impact on
minority voters.173 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the district
court failed to recognize that there was a cognizable decline in all
in-person votes, with a consistent trend of predominantly minority
voter ballots being wholly discarded in violation of the out-ofprecinct policy.174 The court found that the DNC survived step one,
as it only needed to show “a causal connection between the
challenged voting practice and a prohibited discriminatory
result.”175 The DNC successfully showed that the policy of
completely discarding the ballots resulted in a higher percentage
of discarded minority votes in comparison to white votes.176
Beginning the analysis of step two, the court acknowledged
the district court’s discussion of seven Senate factors177 that are
considered in vote denial and dilution claims.178 It was concluded
that the district court minimized the strength of the DNC’s claim
under several factors, and that all of the factors weighed in the
DNC’s favor.179 Following this conclusion, the court held that the

173. See id. at 1014–15 (explaining the rationale the district court employed
in concluding that plaintiffs failed at step one of the results test).
174. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1015 (clarifying that the number of out-of-precinct
votes increased in comparison to the total number of in-person votes cast).
175. See id. at 1016 (stating that the burden of proof plaintiffs needed to meet
to succeed on their claim) (quoting Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement
& Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997)).
176. See id. at 1016 (concluding that the DNC showed a sufficient causal
connection to survive step one of the results test).
177. See id. at 1017.
The district court considered seven of the nine Senate factors: factor one, the
history of official discrimination connected to voting; factor two, racially
polarized voting patterns; factor five, the effects of discrimination in other areas
on minority groups’ access to voting; factor six, racial appeals in political
campaigns; factor seven, the number of minorities in public office; factor eight,
officials’ responsiveness to the needs of minority groups; and factor nine, the
tenuousness of the justification for the challenged voting practice.

178. See id. (indicating that of all the Senate factors, some are more relevant
than others, depending on the case at hand).
179. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1032 (reasoning that the DNC provided sufficient
evidence to show that all the Senate factors, specifically five and nine, weigh in
their favor).
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out-of-precinct policy imposed a significant disparate burden on
minority groups in violation of the results test of Section 2.180
H.B. 2023 was also evaluated under the results test provided
by Section 2.181 At the threshold of the analysis, the court identified
that uncontested evidence presented in the district court showed
that a disproportionate number of minority voters utilized third
party services to collect and deliver their absentee ballots prior to
the enactment of H.B. 2023.182 The district court classified this
evidence as “circumstantial and anecdotal.”183 The Ninth Circuit
determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, finding
that it was direct testimonial evidence that established large
numbers of absentee ballots collected by third parties were from
minority voters.184 The court held that H.B. 2023 succeeded in step
one of the results test, as the statute resulted in a disparate burden
on minority voters.185
In consideration of step two, the district court did not
differentiate its discussion of the test in regards to the out-ofprecinct policy or H.B. 2023.186 The Ninth Circuit found that the
same Senate factors that weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs for the
out-of-precinct policy, also applied to H.B. 2023.187 Following this

180. See id. (concluding that Plaintiffs have carried the burden to meet both
steps of the results test and have shown a violation of Section 2).
181. See id. (following the same standard used to evaluate the out-of-precinct
policy under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
182. See id. (finding that evidence of minority reliance on third party vote
collection is undisputed, and that there is no evidence of white voters’ significant
reliance on this method of vote collection).
183. See id. at 1033 (citing the district court’s conclusion that the evidence
was insufficient to establish a claim under Section 2).
184. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1033 (refuting the conclusion drawn in the district
court based on the facts presented in support of the Plaintiffs’ claim).
185. See id. (concluding that the district court clearly erred when determining
that H.B. 2023 did not succeed on the first step of the results test).
186. See id. (pointing out that the district court did not make a distinction in
their evaluation of the Senate factors in application to either of the two election
laws at issue).
187. See id. (regarding Senate factors five, the effects of discrimination in
other areas on minorities access to voting, and nine, the tenuousness of the
justification for the challenged voting practices, as especially important in the
analysis).
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determination, the Court held that H.B. 2023 also violated the
results test under section 2.188
H.B. 2023 was further analyzed using the “intent test”
embedded in section 2.189 To prevail under the intent test, the DNC
needed to show that discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor for the enactment of the legislation at issue.190 In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation,191 the Supreme Court delineated the following list of
factors for courts to consider when assessing claims of intentional
discrimination:192 (1) the historical background; (2) the sequence of
events leading to enactment, including any substantive or
procedural departures from the normal legislative process; (3) the
relevant legislative history; and (4) whether the law has a
disparate impact on a particular racial group.193 Once it had been
established that racial discrimination was a motivating factor
behind legislative enactment, the burden shifted to Arizona to
demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without the
discriminatory motivation.194 Here, the Ninth Circuit held that all
four of the factors weighed in favor of the DNC.195 Additionally, the
court made a factual finding that H.B. 2023 would not have been

188. See id. at 1037 (recognizing that a large portion of the Senate factor
analysis for the out-of-precinct policy similarly applied to H.B. 2023).
189. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1037 (applying the intent test provided by Section
2 to assess the discriminatory nature of the enactment of House Bill 2023).
190. See id. at 1038 (differentiating between the discriminatory purpose being
a “primary” motive for legislation); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) (establishing the test for analyzing
claims of intentional discrimination).
191. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977) (describing factors that must be examined with claims of intentional
discrimination).
192. See id. at 266 (providing a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to
apply to the voting legislation at issue).
193. See id. at 266–68 (listing factors used to determine if legislation was
enacted with discriminatory intent).
194. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (explaining the burdenshifting mechanism that provides defendants with an opportunity to defend the
enactment of the law).
195. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1041 (9th Cir. 2020)
(holding that the district court clearly erred in determining that the DNC did not
meet the initial burden under the intent test).
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enacted without racial discrimination.196 In finding that H.B. 2023
failed the intent test, the court reasoned that it was also in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.197
In holding that the out-of-precinct policy violated the results
test of Section 2 and H.B. 2023 violated both the results test, the
intent test, and the Fifteenth Amendment, the court departed from
the district court and initial case in the Ninth Circuit to hold in
favor of the DNC on all of the claims.198 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit created a window of opportunity for voters to bring claims
against mail-in voting regulations that can be shown to
disadvantage minority voters.199
2. Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
Recently in 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the Arizona voting legislation disproportionately
affected participation in the electoral process.200 In an opinion
authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court ruled that neither
Arizona’s out-of-precinct rule, nor its ballot-collection law violates
section 2.201 The Court’s rationale relied heavily on the precedent
set in Crawford202 to determine that the burdens imposed by these

196. See id. (citing race-based allegations made by Arizona state Senators as
justification for this conclusion).
197. See id. (correlating meeting the burden of the intent test with a violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment).
198. See id. at 1046 (reciting the holding that departed from the procedural
posture of the case).
199. See id. at 1008–15 (imposing a lower burden for Plaintiffs who bring
claims under Section 2).
200. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021)
(granting certiorari to review the out-of-precinct policy and H.B. 2023 that
dictates the Arizona voting regime).
201. See id. at 2343–44 (reciting the Court’s holding in favor of the
Petitioners).
202. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192–99 (2008)
(concluding that “the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV, gathering the
required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a
substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant increase
over the usual burdens of voting”).
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restrictions were not unconstitutional.203 Justice Alito emphasized
that despite the evidence of statistical showing of a higher rejection
rate for minority votes cast, no racial disparity existed.204 The
Court also reasoned that the State justifications proffered for the
Arizona voting laws supported any burdens.205 The decision noted
that Section 2 does not require a state to show that its chosen
policy is absolutely necessary, or that a less restrictive means
would not comply with the state’s objectives.206 Ultimately, the
Court concluded that the “modest” racially disparate burdens
imposed by the Arizona election laws, juxtaposed with the state
justifications, do not violate Section 2.207 By doing this, the Court
foreclosed any opportunities for discriminatory election legislation
to be challenged under Section 2.208 Further, the Court found that
H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose.209
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Elena Kagan,
presented that the Congressional intent of enacting section 2 was
to prevent these explicitly discriminatory policies.210 Justice Kagan
emphasized that Section 2 provides sweeping language that
prohibits any “voting qualification” any “prerequisite to voting,” or
“any standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on account of race.”211 The dissent
heavily criticized the majority’s approach for failing to consider
203. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2344 (comparing the burdens set forth as
unconstitutional in this case to the burdens determined to be constitutional in
Crawford).
204. See id. at 2344–45 (noting that the racial disparity was small and that
the system was not inequitable for certain populations).
205. See id. at 2345 (finding that the Court of Appeals’ decision “failed” to give
appropriate weight to the state interests advanced).
206. See id. at 2345–46 (interpreting Section 2 jurisprudence and applying it
to the Arizona voting policy).
207. See id. at 2346–2348 (concluding that Section 2 does not provide a
remedy for disadvantaged minority voters).
208. See id. at 2372–2373 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the
majority opinion cuts the breadth and strength of the protections afforded by
Section 2).
209. See id. at 2349–50 (majority opinion) (finding that there is no evidence
that the legislature as a whole was racially motivated in enacting H.B. 2023).
210. See id. at 2365 (pointing out that states have historically intertwined
discriminatory voting laws cloaked in facially neutral procedure).
211. See id. at 2356 (reiterating the purpose of Section 2 as it applies to the
case at hand).
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Section 2 precedent and a voter’s “equal opportunity” to cast a
ballot.212 Justice Kagan ended her dissent with skepticism for the
future of voting rights claims, contemplating that the every
American, of every race, is given an equal chance to participate in
democracy, and that Section 2 was a crucial tool to achieve that
goal before it was manipulated by this Court.213
IV. The Evolution of Absentee Voting
With no remedy left under Section 2, the following question
remains: when a minority voter is disadvantaged by a
discriminatory absentee voting practice, how do they create a
cognizable claim?214 For the purposes of this Note, absentee and
mail-in voting will be used interchangeably, and the terms refer to
when registered voters to submit their ballots remotely by mail,
rather than in person at polling stations.215 The foundation of the
current voting by mail-in ballot system in the United States can be
traced back as early as 1874.216 During the American Civil War,
the United States experimented with the idea of allowing someone
to cast a vote in an election remotely.217 As industrialization surged
in the United States, the presence of absentee voting respectively
intensified.218 Each year since then, more voters have made the
212. See id. at 2361 (explaining how the Court did not carefully consider the
language and widespread application of Section 2 in the majority opinion).
213. See id. at 2373 (refuting the majority’s interpretation of Section 2 and
explaining that Congress enacted Section 2 to prevent the discriminatory effects
that these laws have created).
214. See discussion infra Part V.
215. See Absentee and Early Voting, USA GOV (last updated Oct. 8, 2020)
(defining examples of people who are permitted to vote absentee as voters who
reside in the United States, United States military members and families
stationed outside of the United States, and overseas United States citizens)
[https://perma.cc/7GZJ-ZLRM].
216. See generally RUSS W. CARTER, WAR BALLOTS: MILITARY VOTING FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO WWII (Military Postal History Society ed., 2005) (clarifying that
precedents to absentee voting existed in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and about
half of the Confederate states).
217. See id. (explaining that the Ohio legislature enacted a provision that
allowed many eligible male voters were stationed outside of their home districts
fighting in the American Civil War to vote absentee in the 1864 presidential
election).
218. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 122–23 (Basic Books ed., 2009) (interpreting
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choice to mail in their ballots and the states have responded by
regulating procedures to safeguard the integrity of the election
process.219
In general, citizens in every state have access to absentee
voting, yet rules vary on who can partake.220 Absentee voting
regulations also differ from state to state,221 and the ability to vote
in this manner has been construed as a privilege to voters, as
opposed to an absolute right.222 This is because the Constitution
expressly grants the states authority to establish specific voting
qualifications, including the time, place, and manner by which one
can participate.223 The freedom states have in crafting election law
also encompasses the construction of absentee voting
procedures.224 Consequently, the rules governing a citizen’s ability
to vote in this manner depends on the state where the citizen is
registered to vote.225
Despite the patchwork of statutory regimes, the Voting Rights
Act has imposed a number of national standards relevant to the
the industrial revolution in the United States as a potential reason for why more
than twenty states adopted formal registration absentee voting procedures for
individuals who could demonstrate a work-related reason for being absent on
election day).
219. See EAVS DEEP DIVE: EARLY, ABSENTEE AND MAIL VOTING, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N, Oct. 17, 2017, at 2 (graphing the large rise in the percentage
of absentee and mail-in ballots over a span of 12 years ranging from 2004 to 2016)
[https://perma.cc/NS3W-FPNL].
220. See KEYSSAR, supra note 218, at 123 (disclosing that some states may
require voters to have a valid excuse to send an absentee ballot in the mail in lieu
of their in-person vote).
221. This note will not discuss the validity of any particular state’s absentee
voter laws as that would require a particular evaluation of state constitutional
provisions.
222. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Com’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 811 (1969)
(upholding an Illinois absentee voting provision that denied pretrial detainees the
ability to vote by absentee ballot despite a challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause); Sheils v. Flynn, 299 N.Y.S. 64, 78–80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937) (stating that
the state legislature is authorized to provide the manner, time, and place of voters
who are absent on election day).
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
224. See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808–09 (describing the deference that the
court gives to the state’s election law procedures as a presumption of statutory
validity upon review).
225. See id. at 810–11 (affirming that states have the autonomy to determine
absentee voting procedures).
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absentee voting scheme.226 For example, in 1970, the legislation
was amended to include uniform nation rules for absentee
registration and voting in presidential and vice-presidential
elections.227 These amendments have been challenged and upheld
in the Supreme Court as a reasonable means for eliminating an
unnecessary burden on the right of interstate travel.228 Further, to
address the needs of vulnerable or disabled voters, a provision was
enacted to allow for a voter that requires assistance to vote due to
a disability or impairment to be given help in casting a ballot by a
person of the voter’s choice.229 This wake of reform in the twentieth
century has been in attempt to adapt to the growing needs of our
more diverse, transient, and flexible society.230
A. Who Can Vote Absentee?
Absentee voting is a distinctly different process than in-person
voting and requires vastly different procedures to be performed in
accordance with the corresponding state statute where the election
is taking place.231 At the time this is written, only sixteen states
require registered voters to provide an “excuse”232 to vote by mail

226. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2018).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2018).
228. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340–41 (1972) (maintaining the
holding that the amendments made to the federal Voting Rights Act, mandating
absentee voting for presidential elections, as constitutional under the travel and
enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
229. See 52 U.S.C. § 10508 (specifying that if a voter requires assistance
because of blindness, disability, or illiteracy, they are permitted to have
assistance from anyone other than the voter’s employer or agent of that employer,
or officer or agent of the voter’s union).
230. See KEYSSAR, supra note 218, at 123 (laying a basis for the legislative
amendments that have been implemented to provide voter protections).
231. See Absentee and Mail Voting Policies in Effect for the 2020 Election,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 3, 2020) (providing a survey
of the different absentee and mail voting policies across the nation)
[https://perma.cc/7ATY-8G74].
232. See Table 2: Excuses to Vote Absentee, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 20, 2020) (providing specific examples of excuses that states
require for their citizens to vote by mail, including illness, disability, work,
religious beliefs, etc.) [https://perma.cc/E5RW-73UK].
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in an election, the other thirty-four and Washington D.C. either do
not require an excuse or conduct all mail elections.233
Although many voters are eligible to vote using an absentee
ballot, characteristics of voters who request an absentee ballot
systemically differ in comparison with registered voters in the
remainder of the population.234 It has been maintained that
minority groups are less inclined to cast an absentee ballot because
they are less likely to have a permanent address, more likely to
live in areas inconsistent with mail delivery, and are more prone
to not return mail they receive.235 As a consequence of these
pervasive issues, mail-in voting has led to a disparate impact on
the rejection of mail-in votes from minority and vulnerable
groups.236
1. Current Absentee Voting Regime
To best accommodate the increasing numbers of voters
deciding to mail their ballot before election day, individual states
have promulgated more restrictive measures on casting an
absentee ballot in an effort to continue to closely regulate statewide voting regulations.237 States have chosen to implement these
requirements to protect a multitude of state interests in the
electoral process.238 If a ballot fails to meet strict state

233. See generally Table 1: States with No-Excuse Absentee Voting, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BT9SVUSK].
234. See THAD KOUSSER & MEGAN MULLIN, DOES VOTING BY MAIL INCREASE
PARTICIPATION? USING MATCHING TO ANALYZE A NATURAL EXPERIMENT 430
(Cambridge Univ. Press et al. eds., 2007) (finding that those who choose to vote
by absentee ballot are more likely to be male, well-educated, older Republicans).
235. See Stephanopoulos, supra, note 1, at 1644–45 (elaborating on factors
that are prevalent among minority groups that explain why they are
disproportionately affected by mail-in voting).
236. See id. (weighing the impact that mail-in voting has on minority voters
and concluding that those groups are at a disadvantage if they wanted to vote
absentee in an election).
237. See John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the
Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 483, 508–
09 (2003) (exploring state concerns in regulating mail-in voting procedures).
238. See Bell v. Gannaway, 227 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Minn. 1975) (citing the
preservation of the enfranchisement of voters, the secrecy of the voter’s ballot, the
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requirements, it has the possibility to be rejected by the vote
tabulator, causing that individual’s vote to be not counted.239
States have autonomy in implementing absentee voting
regulations that further state interests and simultaneously
safeguard the election process.240 A frequently implemented form
of absentee ballot requirement amongst state statutes is that an
absentee ballot shall be opened, marked, closed, and sealed in the
presence of a witness, and it shall be accompanied by a prescribed
affidavit of the voter and the certificate of the witness.241 Across
the nation, ballots are regulated by, and can be rejected upon
arrival for, reasons including mismatched signatures242, technical
errors243, and postage issues.244 During the 2016 Presidential
Election, almost twenty-four percent of approximately one
hundred and forty million votes were mailed in, and over three
hundred thousand of those votes were discarded and not
prevention of fraud, and the compilation of election results in a reasonable
timeframe to determine the election outcome as state interests advanced through
absentee voter legislation).
239. See Colten v. City of Haverhill, 564 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Mass. 1991)
(illustrating the principle by evaluating the validity of ballots that were not
counted in a Massachusetts election).
240. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 508 (clarifying the authority and
interest states have in administering elections according to state prescribed
standards).
241. See Colten, 564 N.E.2d at 990–91 (verifying the validity of a
Massachusetts absentee voting provision that requires the form to be completed
in front of a witness and enclosed with a corresponding properly executed
affidavit).
242. See Connolly v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 536 N.E.2d 1058, 1063–
64 (Mass. 1989) (holding that elderly voters’ absentee ballots containing
signatures followed by initials was technically a violation of the Massachusetts
statute); Saucedo v. Gardner, 335 F. Supp. 3d 202, 222 (D.N.H. 2018) (ruling that
New Hampshire’s signature-match requirement for mail-in votes was facially
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because of the natural
variation in voters’ signatures, the absence of training on handwriting analysis
for reviewers, and the lack of compliance measures).
243. See Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321, 1329–31 (Cal. 1993) (finding that
ballots that were collected and returned to the county clerk by a political
association could not be counted, and absentee ballots that had political
associations listed as the address for ballots to be sent could also not be counted).
244. See Washington v. Hill, 960 So.2d 643, 650 (Ala. 2006) (confirming the
validity of an Alabama absentee voting statute which provided that votes may be
rejected if they are retrieved from the United States Post Office without a
postmark or postmarked with a date later than a day before the election).
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counted.245 In 2017, sixteen states had more than fifty percent of
voters choose to vote at the polling place before Election Day or
prior to the election by absentee ballot.246 Most recently, in the
2020 general election, some states had more than two percent of
all absentee ballots cast be discarded for an error.247 While that
percentage may seem insignificant, it is important to remember
that the fundamental right to vote is at stake, and as more people
make the choice to vote absentee, it will continue to rise unless
state restrictions are given less deference in judicial decisions.248
a. State Justifications for Absentee Voting Restrictions
In general, states are focused on safeguarding the integrity of
the electoral process through implementation of strict absentee
ballot regulations.249 States posit numerous justifications for strict
compliance with superfluous election regulations.250 The option to
partake in the mail-in voting process presents a large range of
public interest issues for states to regulate through legislation.251
Prevention of voter fraud is often specified as a state interest when

245. See generally U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, THE ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY, 2016 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT (2016)
(reporting on statistics from the 2016 general election and the number of mailed
ballots that were not counted).
246. See EAVS DEEP DIVE: EARLY, ABSENTEE AND MAIL VOTING, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N, Oct. 17, 2017, at 3 (reporting statistics on states that had
more than half of their ballots cast early, absentee, or by mail during the 2016
presidential election).
247. See Election Downloads: 11/03/2020, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS (2020), (reporting that North Carolina rejected almost 2.5 percent of
absentee ballots in the 2020 general election) [https://perma.cc/BHW2-ZT8Z].
248. See discussion infra Part V.B.
249. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192–99 (2008)
(viewing the interest of safeguarding voter confidence as closely related to other
interests promulgated by the state).
250. See id. at 192 (listing all of the state interests in enacting the photo
identification provision).
251. See Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other
Voting at Home Options, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept.
24, 2020) (presenting advantages and disadvantages to the mail-in voting
process) [https://perma.cc/HMH5-ZDZ4].
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fashioning mail-in voter laws.252 Identification requirements, like
signature matching and witness oversight, are explained by the
desire to deter fraudulent votes.253 Maintaining the secrecy of the
voter’s preferences are of equal importance to the states, who are
concerned with preserving the sanctity of the electoral process.254
These interests are compelling and significant in administering a
proper election, yet they must be weighed against the potential for
voter deprivation to pass constitutional muster.255
b. Issues Faced by Minority and Vulnerable Populations in
Returning an Absentee Ballot
For most Americans, it seems relatively simple to receive an
absentee ballot in the mail and return it according to state
standards.256 There are a multitude of concerns that might present
themselves for specific subsets of the population trying to
participate in an election by mail.257 For example, not every U.S.
citizen has access to mail delivery.258 The issue is made even more
complex as literacy issues often cause further ballot discrepancies
among certain populations.259

252. See id. (proffering that the deterrence of voter fraud is a motivator to
establish election restrictions for absentee votes).
253. See id. (identifying restrictions that are commonly used to achieve that
goal).
254. See Scott v. Kenyon, 105 P.2d 291, 295 (Cal. 1940) (upholding California’s
election law requirements for absentee voting as a means to protect the secrecy
of the voter).
255. See id. at 190 (performing an analysis that weighed the interests put
forward by the state against the asserted injury to determine the constitutionality
of an election regulation).
256. See Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other
Voting at Home Options, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept.
24, 2020) (stating that convenience is an advantage voters have when they choose
to vote by absentee ballot) [https://perma.cc/HMH5-ZDZ4].
257. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1025–26 (presenting examples of barriers citizens
face in the attempt to access a ballot).
258. See id. at 1027–28 (detailing the disparate effect that mail-in voting has
on Native Americans on reservations that do not have street addresses or other
barriers to receiving mail).
259. See id. (explaining that literacy has a disparaging affect for uneducated
voters because election materials are often written at a college level).
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Studies have been conducted in numerous states that conclude
that mailed ballots cast by minority populations are more likely to
be rejected than mail ballots cast by white voters, and relatedly,
these groups are less likely to correct a ballot that has been
returned due to error.260 The burdens of these laws do not fall
equally on all voting populations, as there is evidence of how these
seemingly neutral rules serve to disadvantage young voters and
voters of color.261 Research derived from the 2018 election in
Florida revealed that the rejection rate for mail-in ballots for ages
eighteen to twenty-one was almost two percent higher than the
voters age sixty-five and older.262 The same study identified Black
and Hispanic minority groups have a higher percentage of mail-in
votes rejected as compared to White voters.263 There are similar
controversaries from vulnerable groups, such as disabled
populations, that are comparably disadvantaged from the strict
absentee voting standards.264
It is vital to directly address the broader regulatory state
interests in implementing these strict mail-in voting standards.265
It has been argued that with appropriate modern safeguards,
voting by mail produces a scant number of fraudulent votes.266
Over the past twenty years, more than 250 million ballots have
been cast by mail, yet there have been less than one hundred and
260. See generally Steve Bousquet, Study: Mail Ballots Have Higher Rejection
Rates and They Vary Widely by County, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7QW5-JJXR]; Chris Joyner & Jennifer Peebles, AJC Analysis:
Absentee Voting Pitfalls Tripped Thousands of Ga. Voters, THE ATLANTA J. CONST.
(Dec. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5CB8-D49Z].
261. See id. (identifying the age and race disparity in rejection of mail-in
ballots).
262. See Anna Baringer et al., Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection: Lessons
from Florida for Elections in the Age of Coronavirus, 19 ELECTION L.J. 289, 309
(2020) (reporting on the total rejected ballots among different age groups).
263. See id. at 299 (finding that White mail-in votes are rejected at a rate of
0.9 percent and Black and Hispanic voters are rejected at rates of 1.96 percent
and 2.05 percent, respectively).
264. See Drenth v. Boockvar, No. 1:20-CV-00829, 2020 WL 4805621, at *1 (M.
D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2020) (noting the preliminary injunction that required the state
to provide an “Accessible Write-n Ballot”).
265. See discussion infra Part V.
266. See Marc Elias, Four Pillars to Safeguard Vote by Mail, DEMOCRACY
DOCKET (Mar. 18, 2020) (arguing that minority and vulnerable groups are
disproportionately affected as mail-in voters) [https://perma.cc/L8GY-EZAG].
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fifty criminal convictions for election fraud related to mail-in
ballots.267
V. Minority and Vulnerable Populations Deserve Protection
Surrounding the Right to Cast an Absentee Ballot Under the
Constitution
The excessive history of voting rights jurisprudence in an
attempt to safeguard minority and vulnerable voters is illustrious
of the need for a specific judicial remedy in the case of absentee
ballot discrimination. Mail-in voting disproportionately harms
voters in a racial minority group and voters with disabilities or
impairments.268 Higher rejection rates and lower return rates of
absentee ballots from these groups compared to other subsets of
the population are clear evidence of this declaration.
Notwithstanding the abundance of legal precedent, this
precise question still remains: which legislative provision provides
a cognizable and promising judicial remedy for disenfranchised
minority and vulnerable absentee voters?269
The Fourteenth Amendment permits states to enact laws that
create a reasonable burden on the right to vote.270 The Equal
Protection Clause has been the basis for a plethora of litigation to
determine the definition of a “reasonable burden” in voting rights
cases.271 In Crawford, the Supreme Court applied a balancing
framework on a voter identification law to refine the

267. See Election Fraud Cases, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (reporting on all
incidents of election fraud nationwide and indicating the type of fraud that was
found in each case) [https://perma.cc/U2JR-AYKZ].
268. See Danielle Root et al., In Expanding Vote by Mail, States Must
Maintain In-Person Voting Options During the Coronavirus, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (pointing out that there is a clear imbalance of minority and
vulnerable populations voting by mail compared to majority populations and
arguing that an in-person voting option is necessary for these groups when no
other option remains) [https://perma.cc/H7LE-3HL3].
269. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 1588 (questioning how the judicial
system can create a remedy for deprived voters).
270. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441–42 (upholding Hawaii’s prohibition on
write-in voting as a reasonable burden on voters that is valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
271. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”).
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understanding of a reasonable burden of an election regulation.272
The framework involved weighing the state justifications in
enacting the regulation against the burden faced by voters as a
result of the regulation at issue.273 This framework has been the
cornerstone for evaluating state voting regulations as recent as the
year 2021.274 In ruling that the voter identification law did not
impose “excessively burdensome requirements” and that the state
interests were “sufficiently strong” in enacting the provision, the
Court implied a significant amount of deference to the state’s
proffered justifications without much further inquiry.275
In the years following the Crawford decision, many district
and circuit courts have continued to apply the balancing test with
an interpretation that declined to give states as much deference in
their justifications for strict voting regulations.276 Specifically, the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that an
election law violated the Fourteenth Amendment from applying
the Crawford balancing test, but instead of analyzing whether the
election law was “sufficient” to achieve state objectives, it asked
whether the regulations were “necessary” to accomplish state
interests and burden a plaintiff’s rights.277 Furthermore, some
courts did not give as much weight to the state’s justifications for
the election law at issue, purposely because the law limited a
minority voter’s effective exercise of the electoral franchise and the
burdens on an entire racial population facing a disadvantage were

272. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (acknowledging that balancing tests have
been utilized in claims challenging election regulations).
273. See id. at 191 (identifying the claims of both parties before weighing and
determining whether the burden asserted by the state is reasonable in light of
the justifications).
274. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338 (applying the Crawford analysis to
claims brought against an alleged discriminatory voting practice).
275. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203–04 (concluding that the election law
regulation was reasonable on a facial challenge).
276. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 686–88 (2014) (applying a
balancing test that identifies the natures of the states’ interests and the voter’s
burden to ask whether the states interests make it necessary to burden the voter’s
rights), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830
F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016).
277. See id. at 685 (“[T]aking into consideration ‘the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden a plaintiff’s rights.’” (quoting from Burdick
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
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characterized as particularly strong.278 The courts have postulated
that the burden of discrimination imposed on voters were
distinguished from the burdens in Crawford as more severe,
resulting in an unreasonable burden despite the state’s purpose in
enacting the regulation.279 The court found that although the state
justifications were similar, the discriminatory result was too
severe to justify.280 The Crawford balancing test was originally
formulated in deciding the constitutionality of an in-person voting
regulation.281 However, the test has also been employed by district
courts in deciding the constitutionality of mail-in ballot
regulations that unduly burdened the minority vote.282 Therefore,
it would be appropriate to apply the Crawford balancing tests to
Fourteenth Amendment claims to mail-in voting requirements in
the future.283 Moreover, in federal district court the Equal
Protection Clause has been construed to provide protection to
disabled and elderly voters from mail-in voting signature match
requirements, permitting the Crawford test in application of these
claims as well.284

278. See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 143–44 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding
that Texas failed to prove that a photo-identification law did not have a
retrogressive effect on the racial minority vote), vacated, 570 U.S. 928 (2013); see
also N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2016)
(classifying the state justifications as “meager” in comparison to the apparent
racial discrimination).
279. See One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 949 (W.D. Wis.
2016) (finding that the burden on voters who were facing racial discrimination in
an effort to cast an absentee ballot were much greater than those who faced
obstacles complying with a photo-identification requirement), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2020).
280. See id. (concluding that otherwise qualified voters were experiencing
limited access to the vote as a result of the regulations).
281. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (reasoning that the state’s interest must
be “relevant in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process”).
282. See Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 935 (finding that the state’s interests
did not justify the racial discrimination caused by the mail-in voting regime).
283. See id. at 929–30 (applying Crawford’s balancing test throughout after
the plaintiff claimed the voting law impermissibly burdens voters in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
284. See Frederick v. Lawson, 481 F. Supp 3d 774, 798–99 (S.D. Ind. 2020)
(emphasizing that the state’s interests were not sufficient to justify the burdens
placed upon disabled and elderly voters).
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Landmark Supreme Court cases have also signaled a cause of
action under the Fourteenth Amendment.285 Justice Ginsberg’s
dissenting opinion in Shelby County provides support for this
proposition.286 There, she argued that there was a means to
eliminate the invidious voting discrimination by explicitly pointing
to the Fourteenth Amendment as support for providing relief to
disenfranchised minority voter populations.287
Circuit courts have also seen explicit challenges to mail-in vote
requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment.288 The court in
Hobbs did not make a finding on the Fourteenth Amendment claim
against the absentee voting provisions that allegedly
discriminated against minority populations.289 Hobbs was
consolidated and granted writ of certiorari to consider a claim of
facially neutral voter restrictions that disproportionately affect
minority populations under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.290
The Supreme Court granting certiorari and deciding the case,
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee291 was indicative of
the fact that there is a disadvantage that minority and vulnerable
populations face when attempting to cast a mail-in ballot;
unfortunately because the Court found that no remedy was
available under Section 2, there must be another alternative
available to successfully adjudicate these claims, as the absentee
voting regime is only getting more prevalent.292 Justice Kagan’s

285. See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 567–68 (providing the Fourteenth
Amendment as a foundation for challenging voter discrimination issues).
286. See id. at 568 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce the coverage formula
at issue).
287. See id. at 579 (identifying that a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
has occurred when a subset of the population is indirectly excluded from the
electoral process).
288. See, e.g., Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 999 (challenging Arizona’s ballot harvesting
statute under the Fourteenth Amendment).
289. See id. at 1046 (extending the judgment to only the section 2 and
Fifteenth Amendment claims).
290. See Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221
(2020) (granting the petition for certiorari to the Ninth Circuit), rev’d sub nom.
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
291. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (granting certiorari to review the out-ofprecinct policy and H.B. 2023 that dictates the Arizona voting regime).
292. See discussion infra Part V.
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dissenting opinion in Brnovich unwaveringly supports this notion,
as it emphasizes the “right” every American, of every race, has to
equal access to the electoral scheme, and that the majority opinion
undermines this fundamental right.293
Going back to Crawford, if the Court manufactured a revised
balancing test for a claim under the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against the showing of an apparent
disproportionate amount of rejected mail-in ballots from minority
and vulnerable populations, relief should be recognizably
available.294
A. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Should Provide Protection to Disenfranchised Minority and
Vulnerable Populations
A disproportionate effect of tossed absentee ballots from
minority and vulnerable voters can be attributed to strict state
mail-in voting requirements.295 The validity of absentee voting
legislation in light of this data continues to be challenged on Equal
Protection grounds.296 In situations that produce a
disproportionate number of rejected ballots from minority and
vulnerable voters, state justifications for strict absentee ballot
regimes are insufficient to rationalize the excessive burdens.297
These situations produce circumstances unlike the setting in
Crawford, as the burdens there did not involve an issue as

293. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2366 (criticizing fervently the effect of the
majority opinion on voting rights equality).
294. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (examining previous tests the Court
applied with claims challenging voting regulations under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
295. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 1582–83 (pointing out that courts
consider a challenged state election practice against an asserted injury).
296. See ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1322–23 (10th Cir.
2008) (finding that absentee voting procedures that required a voter to complete
an absentee voter application with a personal identification number was
sufficient to confirm the identification of the voter and did not violate equal
protection).
297. See Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 934–35 (concluding that the racial
discrimination and subsequent burdens caused by the mail-in voting regime was
unreasonable despite the state justifications).
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fundamental as discrimination in access to the electoral scheme.298
It has been argued that the justifications set forth in Crawford
were not sufficient in light of the excessive burdens the Indiana
photo identification laws placed on voters.299 Upon consideration of
the Court’s excessive deference to state justifications in that case,
to provide the most protection for minority and vulnerable voters,
a modified version of the balancing test should be applied to these
claims.300 The Crawford balancing test should be applied to mailin voting claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment more regularly, specifically to those
claims that present a showing of discrimination through
disproportionate rejection rates of absentee ballots from minority
and vulnerable voters.301
In adjudicating these claims, courts should also give
considerably less deference to state interests and decide whether
the state interest makes it necessary to burden the voters’ rights
when deciding a claim of discrimination.302 Implementing this
framework will create more protection for minority and vulnerable
voters as it will ensure the state restrictions are not designed to
exclude any portions of the population from enfranchisement.303
B. Mail-In Voting is Here to Stay
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic created a surge in absentee
voters and subsequent absentee voting legislation.304 Disputes of
298. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192 (presenting the burdens of Indiana voters
as “limited” in the context of availability of increased access to the ballot).
299. See Abigail A. Howell, An Examination of Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board: Photo Identification Requirements Make the Fundamental Right
to Vote Far from “Picture Perfect,” S. DAKOTA L. REV. 325, 351–355 (2010)
(analyzing the state justifications from Crawford and finding that they are not
justifiable compared to the burdens).
300. See id. at 353 (arguing that the state justifications received too much
deference in the Crawford case).
301. See id. (supporting the notion that state justifications should not be given
as much weight in the Crawford analysis).
302. See Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 686–88 (determining that Texas failed to
mitigate burdens for eligible voters).
303. See id.
304. See Gallagher v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 477 F. Supp. 3d 19, 51–52
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (concluding that plaintiffs had established their entitlement to
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this nature have illuminated concerns and constitutional
challenges regarding the right to vote by mail.305 States have seen
increased participation from voters as a result of a widely utilized
absentee voting regime, furthering public policy objectives of
promoting the electoral process.306 Therefore, it is essential that
our judicial system provides a cognizable remedy for those
individuals who choose to participate in a process designed to
streamline and protect a voter’s unencumbered access to the
ballot.307
VI. Conclusion
Judicial remedies for discriminatory election legislation have
evolved with our rapidly growing society. As mail-in voting
becomes a more commonly chosen route to exercise the
constitutional right to vote, careful observation of state regulation
is necessary to provide the rights and liberties afforded to our
population. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, and through
applying a modified version of the balancing test laid out in
Crawford, protection is available for minority and vulnerable
populations who have a higher absentee ballot rejection rate. In
trying these discriminatory issues, state justifications must be
found necessary, not sufficient, to prevent the stated risks to
comply with the Equal Protection Clause.

an injunction to rectify the violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution resulting from the state’s decision to not count
non-postmarked absentee ballots cast in the June 23, 2020 primary when those
ballots have other guarantees of being timely mailed).
305. See id. at 42–49 (making a constitutional argument during the COVID19 pandemic).
306. See id. at 30–31 (providing context for the increased participation by
mail-in ballot).
307. See id. at 49–50 (“Requiring Defendants to count valid ballots already
cast will provide clarity in the face of unexpected and constitutionally significant
chaos and strengthen voters’ faith in the franchise.”).

